

Réunion : Sommet du Conseil de sécurité sur “Le maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationales, la prolifération nucléaire, et le désarmement nucléaire”.

Date : 24 septembre 2009

Durée : 7'00'' (150 mots/minute)

Orateur : Gordon Brown, Premier Ministre du Royaume-Uni de Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord

Difficulté : ***

Éléments à fournir :

Review Conference of the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty)	Conférence d'examen du TNP (Traité de non-prolifération)
CTBT Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	TICE Traité d'interdiction complète des essais nucléaires
FMCT treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (fissile material cut-off treaty)	Traité interdisant la production de matières fissiles pour la fabrication d'armes nucléaires
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency	AIEA Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique
fuel cycle	cycle du combustible
warhead	ogives nucléaires

I now invite the distinguished Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, his Excellency The Right Honourable Gordon Brown to take the floor.

With the unanimous agreement today, with the leadership of President Obama, and with the great speeches that have been made around this table, we are sending a united, unequivocal and undivided message across the world today that we, as leaders of nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, are together committed to creating the conditions for a world free from nuclear weapons.

Today's meeting is also a recognition that we are at a decisive moment. We face the risks of a new and dangerous era of new State nuclear-weapon holders and perhaps even non-State nuclear-weapon holders. So, as we prepare for next year's summit in Washington, and the Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty — and, I am pleased to say, with the advice

that we have received from the great statesmen who are here today, Mr. Schultz, Mr. Perry, Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Nunn, as well as all the countries around this table — I believe we should be prepared to act now to renew and refresh for our times the global bargain that is at the heart of the non-proliferation Treaty. It is a bargain under which we affirm the rights and responsibilities of those countries which forgo nuclear weapons, and it is a bargain under which there are tough responsibilities to be discharged by nuclear-weapon States.

And I think there are three elements to the renewal of the non-proliferation Treaty.

First, we have to be clear that civil nuclear power remains an essential part of any solution to the challenges of climate change and energy security, that that means that access to this affordable, safe and dependable energy source must be expanded and, as we have heard from Africa today, we should be prepared to offer access to civil nuclear power to non-nuclear-weapon States.

In doing so, I believe we must, as an international community, be completely confident that we are able to ensure effective mechanisms for multilateral control of the entire fuel cycle, safeguarding fissile material, preventing proliferation with tough and immediate sanctions for those who break the rules. Our country has recently published ideas on how this might be done and how we might establish a new partnership within industry, academia and Governments to solve the technical and policy challenges in this area. And I hope others will join us in this work.

And second, accompanied with access of non-nuclear-power States to civil nuclear power, we must strengthen the non-proliferation regime, for increased access to civil nuclear power must not mean increased risk of further proliferation of nuclear weapons. I believe the lesson of recent months is we cannot stand by when Iran and North Korea reject the opportunities of peaceful civil nuclear power and instead take steps to develop nuclear weapons in a way that threatens regional peace and security.

Today, I believe, we have to draw a line in the sand. Iran must not allow its actions to prevent the international community from moving forward to a more peaceful era. And, as evidence

of its breach of international agreements grows, we must now consider far tougher sanctions together. I believe that, in future, the onus of proof must be on those who breach the non-proliferation Treaty, and we must give the International Atomic Energy Authority the resources it requires to meet and discharge its responsibilities.

I hope we can also make more progress on securing entry into force of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty and make real advances on a fissile material cut-off treaty. And we must take collective action together to enhance nuclear security globally to ensure terrorist groups cannot get access to nuclear materials. I warmly welcome President Obama's initiative to hold a summit on nuclear security next year. Today, the United Kingdom has deposited with the United Nations our instrument of ratification of the Convention on Nuclear Terrorism, and I hope other countries will follow.

But there is a third obligation in these future negotiations. Nuclear-armed States must pursue active disarmament with a credible road map that will command the confidence of all the non-nuclear-weapon States. We should commit to making irreversible the steps on disarmament we have already taken; we should work together to map out the next steps on the road to the elimination of nuclear weapons. Credibility is the key, and the International Atomic Energy Authority already undertakes detailed inspections. We need to be more transparent if we are rapidly and verifiably to reduce nuclear weapons globally.

The United Kingdom has already taken some major steps towards disarmament, reducing by 75 per cent the explosive power of our stockpile. France has made important progress too. And, of course, the United States and Russia have made strong progress on negotiating a new Start treaty. The current plan to reduce warhead stockpiles to less than 1,500 should now be followed by further reductions of all nuclear-weapon types. Thereafter, we believe in expanding the talks to include all other countries. Britain is determined to play its part in full, making our deterrent part of a broader negotiation.

We stand ready to participate and to act. I pledge today that the United Kingdom will retain only the absolute minimum credible and continuing nuclear deterrent capability. As a demonstration of that pledge, I can say that today, subject to technical analysis and to

progress in multilateral negotiations, my aim is that, when the next class of submarines enters service in the mid-2020s, our fleet should be reduced from four boats to three. I have therefore directed our National Security Committee to report to me before the end of this year.

This conference today recognizes we are at a watershed moment. The choices being made now by each nation will determine whether we face a future arms race or a future of arms control. But if we rise to this challenge, then our generation — a generation that has known all too often only the horrors of conflict and the perils of proliferation — will be remembered not for the years of tension, but for the years of progress. And we will be remembered for the time we came together to secure the future of our world for generations to come.

Thank you.

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